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Remodeling “Model Aircraft”: Why Restrictive 
Language That Grounded the Unmanned 
Industry Should Cease To Govern It 
Maxwell Mensinger* 
  INTRODUCTION   
In late 2011, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
issued a $10,000 fine to Raphael Pirker for flying a “five-pound 
styrofoam [sic] model airplane” over the University of Virginia.1 
The University had hired Lewis Communications to supply aer-
ial photographs and video of its new medical center and cam-
pus, and Lewis Communications in turn compensated Pirker 
for conducting the flight and capturing the desired film.2 When 
the FAA sent him a letter of investigation by e-mail alleging 
that he had recklessly operated a small unmanned aerial sys-
tem (UAS or sUAS)—more colloquially known as a “drone”3—
 
*   J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; Willamette 
University, B.A. 2013. I heartily thank the incredible professors who helped 
me write and refine this piece, including Professor Ann Burkhart and Profes-
sor Dale Carpenter. I extend this to Professor Sammy Basu and Professor Da-
vid Gutterman, both of whom supported my early scholarship in my under-
graduate years and provided writing advice that haunts me to this day. Many 
thanks to my family, friends, and (of course) the staff and editors of the Min-
nesota Law Review. Lastly—and perhaps mostly—I thank my wife, Jenna, for 
believing in me, and for tolerating the scrambled and innumerable ravings of a 
law student thinking far more than is healthy about constitutional property 
rights. Copyright © 2015 by Maxwell Mensinger. 
 1. Patrick Egan, Pirker Submits Reply Brief in Response to the FAA’s 
Appeal, SUAS NEWS (May 13, 2014), http://www.suasnews.com/2014/05/29199/ 
pirker-submits-reply-brief-in-response-to-the-faas-appeal; see also Pirker, 
Docket No. CP-217, 2014 WL 3388631, at *1 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 6, 2014). 
 2. FAA, PIRKER INVESTIGATION, http://www.scribd.com/doc/223797459/ 
Pirker-Investigation. 
 3. Drones, or UAS, come in a variety of shapes and sizes. See, e.g., Ian 
Bott, Cleve Jones & John Burn-Murdoch, Great and Small: The Many Types of 
Drone, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013, 6:53 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ 
2eeba9b0-21d5-11e3-bb64-00144feab7de.html. Their forms span that of the 
mammoth Global Hawk to that of Pirker’s five pound Styrofoam model air-
plane. UAS weighing less than 55 pounds under current law, see FAA Modern-
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and endangered persons and property on the ground, Pirker 
fought the allegations.4 The resulting contest ignited a debate 
long brewing about the federal government’s role in regulating 
UAS in the national airspace.5 
The FAA asserts regulatory authority over commercial 
UAS.6 Although some commentators argue that the FAA has no 
such authority,7 the FAA, unsurprisingly, says otherwise. Its 
policy statement, issued in 2007, explains that “no person may 
operate a UAS in the National Airspace System without specif-
ic authority.”8 Pursuant to this policy, the FAA makes obtain-
ing such authority exceedingly difficult,9 and voraciously seeks 
to curb operations that come to its attention.10 In the mean-
time, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA), 
which directs the FAA to issue comprehensive regulations for 
the operation of UAS in the national airspace, has substantially 
hampered individuals’ ability to utilize UAS for commercial 
purposes for the foreseeable future.11  
 
ization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336(a)(3), 126 Stat. 11, 
77 (2012), are typically referred to as sUAS, or “small” UAS. For simplicity’s 
sake, this Note will group UAS and sUAS into the category of “UAS.” 
 4. See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 5. See generally Pirker, Docket No. CP-217, 2014 WL 8095629 (N.T.S.B. 
Nov. 17, 2014) rev’g Docket No. CP-217, 2014 WL 3388631 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 6, 
2014). Pirker won the first battle, but the N.T.S.B. narrowly reversed on ap-
peal and remanded the case for a determination of recklessness. See Pirker, 
2014 WL 8095629, at *5. Pirker and the FAA subsequently settled the case, 
and Pirker agreed to pay $1,100 with no admission of wrongdoing or regulato-
ry violation. Pirker Drone Case Reaches Settlement, GEOSPATIAL SOLUTIONS 
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://geospatial-solutions.com/pinker-drone-case-reaches 
-settlement.  
 6. See generally FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, §§ 331–36, 
(Unmanned Aircraft Systems). 
 7. See, e.g., Peter Sachs, Current U.S. Drone Law, DRONE L.J. (Dec. 14, 
2013), http://dronelawjournal.com; Egan, supra note 1. 
 8. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 
Fed. Reg. 6689, 6690 (Feb. 13, 2007) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91). 
 9. See Wendie L. Kellington & Michael Berger, Why Land Use Lawyers 
Care About the Law of Unmanned Systems, 37 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., June 
2014, at 1, 4. 
 10. FAA, FOIA RESPONSE LETTERS, http://www.scribd.com/doc/2046155 
20/FAA-FOIA-Response-2-4-14 (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (cease-and-desist 
letters). 
 11. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, §§ 332–36; infra Part 
III. Although the FAA began streamlining its approval process and has now 
issued over a thousand approvals to companies seeking to use UAS, the uni-
versal approval requirements hinder certain individuals and small companies 
seeking to use the technology. See Clay Dillow, FAA Approves More than 1,000 
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The FAA’s position meets fierce opposition from myriad 
scholars12 and organizations13 who preach the value of a thriv-
ing UAS industry, alongside concerns that regulatory delay will 
stunt its growth.14 The FAA’s cautious approach lags far behind 
the process in other countries.15 Although the FAA has released 
its proposed regulations,16 the time required for public com-
ment, and the possibility of their revision,17 has led commenta-
tors to question the FAA’s capacity to meet the rapidly ap-
proaching September 2015 deadline for final rules as specified 
in the FMRA.18 Nevertheless, the FAA cites its obligation to 
shield the national airspace from the dangers that widespread 
UAS presence presents as the prime reason for its delay, and 
 
Commercial Drone Permits, FORTUNE (Aug. 9, 2015), http://fortune.com/ 
2015/08/09/faa-commercial-drone-permits. 
 12.  See, e.g., Nicholas Ryan Turza, Dr. Dronelove: How We Should All 
Learn To Stop Worrying and Love Commercial Drones, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
319 (2014). 
 13. See Kellington & Berger, supra note 9, at 5.  
 14. See Bart Jansen, Federal Appeal May Define FAA Authority over 
Drones, USA TODAY (July 2, 2014, 5:13 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
money/business/2014/07/02/ntsb-drones-faa-appeal-pirker/11793203 (noting 
the expected industry growth and the effect of probable regulatory delay). 
 15. See, e.g., Pierre Chauvin, Canada Is Handling Drones Better than the 
United States, MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 13, 2014, 9:18 AM), http://motherboard 
.vice.com/read/canada-has-a-consumer-drone-problem; Brian Fung, The FAA 
Won’t Make Up Its Mind on Drone Rules Until 2017 at the Earliest, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/ 
2014/12/10/the-faa-wont-make-up-its-mind-on-drone-rules-until-2017-at-the 
-earliest (“Some [businesses] have even threatened to move their drone re-
search overseas if they can’t get permission to operate in the United States.”); 
cf. Kellington & Berger, supra note 9, at 4–5 (noting the FAA’s persistent tar-
diness). 
 16. See FAA, OVERVIEW OF SMALL UAS NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAK-
ING: SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED PART 107 (2015), http:// 
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/media/021515_suas_summary 
.pdf; Press Release, DOT and FAA Propose New Rules for Small Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems, FAA (Feb. 15, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_  
releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=18295 (announcing proposed rules and de-
claring that all “non-recreational operations” will be subject to them). 
 17. See Frederic Lardinois, FAA Proposes Rules To Open the Sky to Some 
Commercial Drones, but Delivery Drones Remain Grounded, TECHCRUNCH 
(Feb. 15, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/15/proposed-faa-rules-will-open 
-the-sky-for-some-commercial-drones-but-delivery-drones-remain-grounded 
(noting that it could take a year or two before the FAA’s rules, and any chang-
es to them, can take effect). 
 18. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 
§ 332(a)(1), (a)(3), 126 Stat. 11, 73 (2012). 
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reasonably so.19 As this Note argues, however, the FAA’s au-
thority to regulate airspace does not, and should not, extend 
absolutely to all aspects of the national airspace. Rather, it 
should extend predominantly to “navigable airspace.”20 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Causby recognized 
that Congress’s professed power “to possess and exercise com-
plete and exclusive national sovereignty in [national] air space” 
derives in fact from its plenary power, under the Constitution’s 
Commerce Clause, “to control navigable airspace.”21 The major-
ity also carved out an individual property interest in “at least 
as much of the space above the ground as [the landowner] can 
occupy or use in connection with the land.”22 This language 
generated significant discussion as to the extent of the individ-
ual interest in airspace over one’s land, as well as to the extent 
of federal, state, and local authority to regulate that airspace.23 
The commercial potential for UAS, and a comprehensive feder-
al obstruction to their use, bring these issues urgently to the 
forefront. 
Part I of this Note provides a snapshot of the current state 
of airspace regulation and explores, in relevant part, the histo-
ry behind it and the competing theories driving it. Part II pro-
ceeds to weigh the validity and respective benefits of these the-
ories insofar as they help or hinder efforts to integrate UAS 
into national airspace. Part III then articulates why a more 
balanced allocation of regulatory power would serve relevant 
individual and governmental interests, as well as the essential 
structure of American federalism. The root problem, this Note 
suggests, is the FMRA’s exclusion of all commercial UAS from 
 
 19. See Taylor Berman, Remote Control Helicopter Partially Decapitates 
Teen in Brooklyn Park, GAWKER (Sept. 5, 2013, 6:25 PM), http://gawker.com/ 
remote-control-helicopter-partially-decapitates-teen-in-1259586314. 
 20. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 271 (1946) (Black, J., dis-
senting); see also 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(b)–(c) (2015) (defining the low mark of 
“navigable airspace” as 1,000 feet above “congested areas” and 500 feet above 
“open water or sparsely populated areas”). 
 21. Causby, 328 U.S. at 271–72 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 22. Id. at 264 (emphasis added). 
 23. See generally Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (hold-
ing that the noise from aircraft landing and taking off constituted a taking if it 
made nearby homes unbearable for residential use); Colin Cahoon, Low Alti-
tude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157 
(1990) (detailing landowners’ property rights in airspace and pointing out un-
resolved legal questions). 
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the definition of “model aircraft.”24 Redefining “model aircraft” 
to allow use “for hobby, recreational, or other use not in or af-
fecting interstate commerce” would pave the way for a richer, 
more effective system of airspace regulation, and in doing so, 
finally allow the unmanned industry to take flight. 
I.  HARNESSING AIRSPACE: THE HISTORY BEHIND THE 
MODERN FRAMEWORK   
Airspace regulation can seem an unintelligible knot, but 
this facade can be untangled. Doing so requires a careful re-
view of the regulatory powers that be, and their role through-
out history. Section A first explains the origins and early devel-
opment of airspace law. Section B then provides an overview of 
United States v. Causby, a formative decision in the develop-
ment of airspace regulation, and one that articulates with some 
precision the authority underlying federal regulatory efforts. 
Notable doctrine flowing from Causby, and its impact on cur-
rent regulatory efforts, is addressed in Section C. Lastly, Sec-
tion D reviews the role of the states in harnessing airspace, and 
the metric of difference between state and federal regulatory 
power in scope, foundation, and significance. 
A. COELUM: RELEGATING AIRSPACE TO REGULATION PRE- 
CAUSBY 
Before the advent of the aircraft, the Latin maxim cujus est 
solum, ejus est usque ad coelum—or rather, the owner of the 
soil owns up to the sky—remained a staple of the common 
law.25 Lord Coke promulgated the maxim fervently in his time, 
 
 24. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 
§ 336(c), 126 Stat. 11, 77−78 (2012). This definition remains controlling under 
the FAA’s proposed rules. See supra note 16. 
 25. See ROBERT R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 7 (1968). The maxim is 
thought to have originated under Roman law, and does not refer to ownership 
of the air—“aër” was “the gas that flowed over the earth’s surface,” and was 
“incapable of appropriation”—but of the “coelum,” or “the area through which 
the air flowed,” which remained “capable of private ownership.” STUART BAN-
NER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM THE 
WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 86 (2008). Although there remains uncertainty as to 
the nature of the property interest protected by the maxim, see, e.g., Howard 
H. Hackley, Trespassers in the Sky, 21 MINN. L. REV. 773, 777 (1937) (suggest-
ing the maxim only guaranteed a right to freedom from interference, but not 
ownership); cf. Lyman v. Hale, 11 Conn. 177, 177 (1836) (“If a tree, the trunk 
of which stands on the land of A, extend some of its branches over . . . the land 
of B . . . such overhanging branches and the fruit thereof[] [are] the sole prop-
erty of A . . . .”), American courts frequently invoked the doctrine to identify 
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and American courts met it with nearly “unquestioning ac-
ceptance.”26 Unsurprisingly, the doctrine’s traditional utility 
manifested in tort and property law; specifically, in nuisance, 
trespass, and ejectment.27 There seemed little doubt that air-
space was, in fact, property, and that the common law afforded 
it protection.28 However, in the face of technological innova-
tions, courts grew reluctant to enforce absolutely landowners’ 
airspace rights under the maxim.29 They increasingly refused 
to recognize or compensate actionable trespasses by planes fly-
ing thousands of feet above the property in question.30 This, in 
turn, posed a troubling prospect: commercial air travel would 
constitute “[f]requent and universal trespass on a large scale, 
theoretically banned by the law,” but seldom deterred by it.31 
Though legal reformers contemplated several different so-
lutions to this problem, sweeping federal regulation, in the 
form of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (ACA), ultimately pre-
vailed.32 The ACA, without explicitly saying so, derived its 
power from the Commerce Clause⎯it delegated to the Secre-
tary of Commerce critical powers, including the authority to 
 
one’s airspace as one’s property, and intrusion therein as trespass or nuisance. 
See generally 2 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 
§ 583 (3d ed. 1939) (explaining a landowner’s rights above the surface).  
 26. TIFFANY, supra note 25.  
 27. See WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 211. 
 28. See, e.g., Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N.Y. 486, 491 (1906) (“What 
does the term [‘real property’] include so far as the action of ejectment is con-
cerned? . . . The surface of the ground is a guide, but not the full measure; for 
within reasonable limitations land includes not only the surface but also the 
space above and the part beneath.”); WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 213 (“Black-
stone, building upon Coke, had stated that the word ‘land’ includes not only 
the face of the earth, but every thing under it, or over it.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 29. See BANNER, supra note 25, at 99−101. 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. at 71. 
 32. See Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-251, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 
568 (1926); BANNER, supra note 25, at 102–34 (documenting the history and 
evolving scope of the Air Commerce Act of 1926). Prior to this Act, many in the 
legal community feared extensive federal control in this arena. Some hoped 
that courts might ultimately effect a change in the common law, while others 
advocated widespread government condemnation of all landowners’ airspace, a 
solution which promised peculiar administrative burdens and democratic diffi-
culties. See id. at 98–99. There were also considerable, though ultimately 
fruitless, efforts to harmonize state laws on air travel and eliminate inconsist-
encies that typically make federal interference attractive. See id. at 104. 
Though these efforts did not prevail, their ideological underpinnings remain a 
persistent, and relevant, counterpoint to federal regulatory efforts. 
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“designate and establish civil airways,”33 to prescribe the con-
tours of the navigable airspace,34 and to “[e]stablish air traffic 
rules for the navigation, protection, and identification of air-
craft.”35 From the outset, the Act established a salient differ-
ence between “air commerce” and “interstate or foreign air 
commerce,” and subjected only interstate air commerce to many 
of its precepts.36 States, therefore, retained a regulatory role in 
the Act’s structure of airspace regulation, so long as State “air-
space reservations” were either “necessary” or “not in conflict [] 
with . . . any civil or military airway [so] designated.”37 In other 
words, states were given authority to regulate so long as their 
regulations did not interfere with federal regulations. Although 
the Act seemed to abrogate the common law coelum maxim, the 
regulatory framework created would prove unable to adequate-
ly address the regulatory needs prompted by developments in 
air travel, and coelum advocates persisted, albeit weakened 
somewhat by changing economic and social needs of the time.38 
Congress subsequently amended the ACA with the Civil 
Aeronautics Act (CAA). The CAA created the Civil Aeronautics 
Board, an agency vested with broader powers than the Secre-
 
 33. Air Commerce Act § 5(b). The term “civil airway” was defined as “a 
route in the navigable airspace designated by the Secretary of Commerce as a 
route suitable for interstate or foreign air commerce.” Id. § 9(j). 
 34. Id. § 10 (“‘[N]avigable airspace’ means airspace above the minimum 
safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce . . . and such 
navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate 
and foreign air navigation in conformity with the requirements of this Act.”). 
 35. Id. § 3(e). 
 36. Compare id. § 1 (“‘[A]ir commerce’ means transportation in whole or in 
part by aircraft of persons or property for hire, navigation of aircraft in fur-
therance of a business, or navigation of aircraft from one place to another for 
operation in the conduct of a business.”), with id. § 3(c) (“‘[I]nterstate or for-
eign air commerce’ means air commerce between any State, Territory, or pos-
session, or the District of Columbia, and any place outside thereof; or between 
points within the same State, Territory, or possession, or the District of Co-
lumbia, but through the airspace over any place outside thereof; or wholly 
within the airspace over any Territory or possession or the District of Colum-
bia.”), and supra notes 33–34. 
 37. Air Commerce Act § 4; see also id. § 1 (defining “interstate or foreign 
air commerce” in a manner that excludes air navigation confined to intrastate 
commerce). 
 38. Cf. Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 977, 982 (1936) (recog-
nizing landowners’ “exclusive right to so much of the space above as may be 
actually occupied and used by him and necessarily incident to such occupation 
and use” (emphasis added)). 
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tary of Commerce under the ACA.39 The CAA contained a no-
ticeably stronger definition of air commerce that included “in-
terstate . . . air commerce . . . by aircraft or any operation or 
navigation of aircraft within the limits of any civil airway or 
any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or 
which may endanger safety in, interstate . . . air commerce.”40 It 
granted citizens “a public right of freedom of transit in air 
commerce through the navigable air space of the United States” 
in a separate section, rather than in the navigable airspace sec-
tion.41 Taken together, the changes reflected Congress’s move 
towards a heavier federal influence in the regulation of air-
space. It preserved the public right of access to the navigable 
airspace granted in the ACA, but implied that any air com-
merce within non-navigable airspace would remain subject to 
extensive federal regulation.42  
However substantial this federal influence became, its 
purpose remained confined to smoothing relations between air 
carriers and ensuring safe travel in a manner comparable to 
the ACA⎯not abrogating all private interest in airspace.43 The 
Supreme Court’s paradigmatic decision in United States v. 
Causby addressed this limitation directly, using the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause as a vessel.44 
B. CAUSBY, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND THE TAKING OF  
AIRSPACE 
The federal government’s authority to regulate airspace is 
“bottomed on the commerce power of Congress.”45 On this basis, 
congressional authority over the navigable airspace mirrored 
 
 39. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, §§ 701–02, 52 
Stat. 973, 1012–14 (1938) (creation and organization of board, duties of the 
board); see also 49 U.S.C. § 401 (1940). 
 40. 49 U.S.C. § 401 (emphasis added). Similarly important definitions, 
such as those of “civil airway” and “navigable air space,” remained virtually 
unchanged. Id. 
 41. Id. § 403. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. §§ 2–3; Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-251, ch. 344, 
§§ 1–2, 44 Stat. 568, 568–69 (1926). 
 44. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261–67 (1946) (holding 
that the interference of use and enjoyment of land by low and frequent flying 
aircraft constitutes a taking); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 4 (“[N]or shall 
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”). 
 45. Braniff Airways v. Neb. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 347 U.S. 590, 
596 (1954). 
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Congress’s plenary power over navigable waters.46 The ACA’s 
legislative history confirms this, linking the declaration of what 
constitutes both navigable airspace and navigable waters to 
federal authority over interstate commerce.47 Although Con-
gress considered using its war power to commandeer air-
space⎯subsuming state power therein⎯it notably chose a dif-
ferent route.48  
This so-called “different route” remains expansive in many 
respects. The unfettered commerce power “acknowledges no 
limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution 
[sic].”49 The Court has identified three categories of activity to 
which it extends: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce”; (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or 
persons or things in interstate commerce”; and (3) “those activi-
ties that substantially affect interstate commerce.”50 Intrastate 
activities are not exempt where “the interstate and intrastate 
aspects of commerc[ial] [activity are] so mingled together that 
full regulation of interstate commerce require[s] incidental reg-
ulation of intrastate commerce.”51 Likewise, where regulation 
of small-scale intrastate activities constitutes “an essential part 
of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regula-
tory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity 
were regulated,” such regulation is constitutionally permissi-
ble.52 Nonetheless, the Constitution requires a distinction be-
 
 46. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 272 (Black, J., dissenting); Scott P. Keifer, 
Aircraft Overflights as a Fifth Amendment Taking: The Extension of Damages 
for the Loss of Potential Future Uses to Avigation Easements, 4 MO. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 88, 92 & n.87 (1996) (“[A]ir space . . . present[s] as to transporta-
tion practical and legal problems similar to those presented by transportation 
by vessels upon the high seas.”). 
 47. Braniff Airways, 347 U.S. at 596–97 (citing legislative history). 
 48. See CHARLES S. RHYNE, THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT ANNOTATED 
WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY WHICH PRODUCED IT, AND THE PRECE-
DENTS UPON WHICH IT IS BASED 67 (1939). One of the prime reasons for this 
choice seems to be Congress’s desire to consolidate authority over air, water, 
and railroad transportation so as to ensure “impartial regulation . . . by a body 
which has no greater responsibility for or interest in one than another.” Civil 
Aeronautics Act of 1938: Hearing on H.R. 5234 and H.R. 4652 Before the H. 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong. 32 (1937) (statement 
of Hon. Joseph B. Eastman, Interstate Commerce Commission). 
 49. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824) (commerce on navigable wa-
ters). 
 50. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. at 554 (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)). 
 52. Id. at 561. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) 
(holding that Congress’s commerce power extends to intrastate activities 
which affect interstate commerce). 
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tween that which is “truly national” and “truly local,” and areas 
traditionally within the ambit of States’ “police power”53 remain 
particularly resistant to this centralized authority.54  
At the time United States v. Causby caught the Supreme 
Court’s attention, Congress’s authority to regulate airspace un-
der the Commerce Clause was not in question; it was assumed 
that such authority extended as far as its commerce power al-
lowed.55 Rather, the majority opinion in Causby, penned by 
Justice Douglas, directly addressed the modern utility of the 
coelum maxim, and its incompatibility with flight technology. 
Plaintiffs owned a chicken farm plagued by frequent military 
overflights that generated sounds and lights so disruptive that 
they spooked upwards of 150 chickens who flew into the walls 
and died.56 The owners argued that these low-altitude flights 
constituted a “taking” of their property for public use within 
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.57 While the Court reject-
ed the coelum maxim as having “no place in the modern world,” 
it agreed that the overflights had “taken” property from the 
owners.58 Both the majority opinion and Justice Black’s dissent 
relied on an interpretation of the ACA, and its definition of 
“navigable airspace.”59  
Causby expressly found a property interest in the “imme-
diate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere,” which signaled 
the Court’s view on the extent of Congressional authority in 
airspace.60 As the majority reasoned, frequent, low overflights 
 
 53. Police power includes “[t]he power of a state to enforce laws for the 
health, welfare, morals, and safety of its citizens, if enacted so that the means 
are reasonably calculated to protect those legitimate state interests.” State Po-
lice Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This power is discussed 
in greater detail infra Part I.D. 
 54. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000). 
 55. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260 (1946); id. at 272 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
 56. See id. at 259 (majority opinion). 
 57. See id. at 258. 
 58. Id. at 261; see also id. at 267 (finding that “a servitude ha[d] been im-
posed upon the land”). 
 59. Compare id. at 263−64 (recognizing the importance of placing “navi-
gable airspace . . . within the public domain” to interstate commerce in the 
modern world, and affirming that the “Civil Aeronautics Authority has, of 
course, the power to prescribe air traffic rules”), with id. at 271−72 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that because “the Constitution entrusts Congress with 
full power to control all navigable airspace,” and further, because “there was 
no showing that the bombers flying over [the chicken farm] violated any rule 
or regulation of the Civil Aeronautics Authority,” there could be no taking). 
 60. Id. at 264 (majority opinion). 
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that disturbed an individual’s ability to use and enjoy her land 
had “taken” an easement thereto.61 Surely, this holding—in a 
Fifth Amendment context—does not cut to the roots of the issue 
presented here: that is, whether Congress exceeds the bounds 
of its commerce power when regulating the use of non-navigable 
airspace within the “immediate reaches of the enveloping at-
mosphere.”62 Nor could it, considering the issue was not before 
the Causby court. Additionally, the Takings context (in which 
issues regarding airspace typically arise) differs in fundamen-
tal ways from the Commerce Clause context.63  
This disjunction does not minimize Causby’s relevance to 
the Commerce Clause questions at issue in this Note. Indeed, 
Justice Douglas offhandedly addressed the tension between 
Causby’s corporeal Takings issue and its spectral Commerce 
Clause shadow. Although he did so in dicta, and only to a lim-
ited extent, it was to this limited extent that the majority and 
the dissenters disagreed. The majority found a taking despite 
the fact that the “path of the glide” was “approved by the Civil 
Aeronautics Authority,” because “Congress” had not placed this 
airspace in the public domain by deeming it navigable.64 Jus-
tice Black, by contrast, understood the ACA and CAA as giving, 
pursuant to its Commerce power, “the Civil Aeronautics Au-
thority exclusive power to determine what is navigable airspace 
subject to its exclusive control,” making a taking impossible 
 
 61. Id. at 266. 
 62. Id. at 264. 
 63. This Note recognizes a basic incompatibility between the substance of 
Takings Clause challenges and Commerce Clause challenges. When faced with 
a Takings challenge, a court asks, in general, whether private property has 
been taken by a federal, state, or local governmental entity for public use; if so, 
compensation is due the landowner. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 
U.S. 469 (2005). By contrast, a Commerce Clause challenge suggests that the 
federal government has regulated something not in or substantially affecting 
interstate commerce; if successful, the regulation is considered ultra vires and 
invalid. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). When courts 
find a taking under the Fifth Amendment, therefore, it follows that such find-
ing remains mutually exclusive from consideration of the merits of any alter-
native Commerce Clause challenge Plaintiff might posit with respect to the 
validity of a regulation. The source of authority is different, and so the inquiry 
is likewise different. Nevertheless, principles derived from both categories of 
constitutional challenges remain helpful in illustrating the regulatory land-
scape with which this Note grapples. 
 64. Causby, 328 U.S. at 263 (emphasis added) (“If that agency prescribed 
83 [sic] feet as the minimum safe altitude, then we would have presented the 
question of the validity of the regulation.” (emphasis added)). This part of the 
opinion likely constitutes dicta, but, as discussed infra, it sowed lasting confu-
sion. 
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where, as in Causby, the flight paths at issue were approved by 
that agency.65 In short, the majority and the dissent found dif-
ferent actors constitutionally responsible for different things, 
and to different extents. 
From this disagreement sprung curiosity as to who “calls 
the shots” over what quantity of airspace: What powers could 
Congress delegate to executive agencies? Did control over navi-
gable airspace entail control over non-navigable airspace as 
well? If so, to what extent? And the (much) later arrival of the 
Court’s Lopez and Morrison opinions, which narrow the scope of 
Congress’s Commerce powers, only muddied the ongoing de-
bate. Of necessity, it seems the Causby Court left these ques-
tions to future courts and congresses. As will be shown, those 
operating in Causby’s wake have provided conceptually differ-
ent answers.  
C. SPACE AS A DISCRETE DYNAMIC OF REGULATION IN AIRSPACE  
POST-CAUSBY 
Following the Causby decision, views on the extent of the 
federal government’s authority to regulate airspace remained 
in flux, due in part to the apparent dichotomy between naviga-
ble and non-navigable airspace. As the Takings doctrine pro-
gressed, differing views emerged as to the significance of this 
spatial division. One reason for this may be dicta in Causby os-
tensibly linking the bounds of navigable airspace with the 
bounds of Takings liability.66 Indeed, following the decision, 
Congress replaced the ACA with the Federal Aviation Act, es-
tablishing the FAA to further enhance the safe and efficient use 
of airspace,67 and reconfiguring the bounds of navigable air-
space to include the space needed for take-off and landing.68  
There remained, however, the reality that overflights with-
in navigable airspace could not easily be classified as less in-
trusive per se to individuals’ “prerogatives of ownership”—a 
right that Causby expressly recognized,69 and which the coelum 
 
 65. Id. at 272 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 66. See id. at 264 (majority opinion) (“If any airspace needed for landing 
or taking off were included [in the definition of navigable airspace], flights 
which were so close to the land as to render it uninhabitable would be im-
mune.”). 
 67. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731, 731 
(1958). 
 68. Id. § 101, 72 Stat. at 739. 
 69. See Cahoon, supra note 23, at 172–73. Even the federal government 
“concede[d]” to the Causby Court that overflights in the navigable airspace 
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maxim traditionally protected.70 If a plane lopped off the roof of 
one’s house while landing, for instance, no court could find the 
government immune to Takings liability, no matter how “navi-
gable” Congress made such airspace.71 
In Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board of Equaliza-
tion and Assessment, a tax case, the Supreme Court further 
deemphasized (albeit indirectly) the significance of the barrier 
between navigable and non-navigable airspace with respect to 
the protection of this individual interest.72 The Court suggested 
in dicta that federal acts regulating “air commerce” were “not 
[founded] on national ownership of the navigable air space,” but 
rather the commerce power, and thus that their “breadth co-
vers all commercial intercourse.”73 This position affirmed wide-
spread federal control of airspace, while placing little import in 
the spatial distinction between navigable and non-navigable 
airspace. 
A different school of thought arose from the Court of 
Claims in Aaron v. United States.74 The Aaron court proposed a 
less flexible Takings standard that rested heavily on the spatial 
distinction between navigable and non-navigable airspace: 
namely, that “what may be permissible above [the floor of the 
navigable airspace] is forbidden below it, unless compensation 
is paid therefor.”75 Although this standard strengthened land-
owners’ Takings claims as to flights below the navigable air-
space, it obliterated them with respect to overflights within the 
bounds of navigable airspace.76 This view, therefore, treats nav-
 
which rendered property below uninhabitable “would be a taking,” a fact 
which reinforces the persisting importance of the individual’s right to exclude 
others from her airspace recognized in Causby. See 328 U.S. at 264. 
 70. See TIFFANY, supra note 25. 
 71. Cahoon, supra note 23, at 165. 
 72. See id. at 178; see also Braniff Airways v. Neb. State Bd. of Equal. & 
Assess., 347 U.S. 590, 596 (1954) (stating that Causby held that “the owner of 
land might recover for a taking by national use of navigable air space, result-
ing in destruction in whole or in part of the usefulness of the land property”). 
 73. Braniff Airways, 347 U.S. at 596–97. 
 74. 311 F.2d 798, 801 (1963) (affirming the Trial Commissioner’s deter-
mination that only “owners of property over which planes flew [beneath the 
boundary separating navigable from non-navigable airspace] were entitled to 
compensation”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. The same Court qualified this rule somewhat in Branning v. United 
States, when it held that a taking “is not precluded merely because the flights 
of Government aircraft are in what Congress has declared to be navigable air-
space and subject to its regulation.” 654 F.2d 88, 99 (1981) (per curiam). But in 
general, a plaintiff will encounter more difficulty before a court applying Aa-
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igable and non-navigable airspace as separate spheres of influ-
ence, the former “belonging” to the federal government, and the 
latter “belonging” to individuals. The federal government be-
comes an intruder when it reaches beneath the barrier fencing 
it in. 
Both the Braniff and Aaron views recognize, at least im-
pliedly, that airspace remains “subject to pervasive governmen-
tal control.”77 But the latter seems to consider this control less 
pervasive, at least in non-navigable airspace, than the former 
does. Where the former condones sweeping federal regulation, 
the latter condemns it. The precedents apply concurrently, but 
imply differing theories of who controls what airspace. And the 
federal government, though omnipresent in the history of air-
space regulation, is not alone in its regulatory efforts. States, 
too, play an active role in steering the development of airspace 
regulation. Moreover, managing the possible impact of techno-
logical innovations like UAS seems to fall squarely within their 
spheres of influence. 
D. AIRSPACE AND STATE POLICE POWER 
While the federal government grappled with uncertainties 
regarding the constitutional extent of its regulatory presence in 
national airspace at the dawn of the twentieth century, states 
and municipalities fought a two-front war.78 On one front, 
states sought to shield localized airspace regulations from fed-
eral preemption, a problem that would magnify in coordination 
with the volume of federal regulation.79 On the other, they 
sought to impose land use limitations on communities.80 The 
rise of Euclidian zoning in the 1920s81 saw states and munici-
 
ron’s standard. 
 77. Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 448, 453 (2004). 
 78. See BANNER, supra note 25, at 30 (“Aviators and lawyers were, of 
course, the primary participants in the . . . debate, but they weren’t the only 
ones. The ownership of space was of interest to all sorts of people for all sorts 
of reasons, whether or not they intended to take to the air themselves.”). See 
generally id. at 4–42 (discussing the evolution of aviation and the ownership of 
airspace). 
 79. See Braniff Airways v. Neb. State Bd. of Equal. & Assess., 347 U.S. 
590, 595 & n.11 (1954) (“[T]he states did not consider their sovereignty affect-
ed by the [ACA] except to the extent that the states had ceded that sovereignty 
by constitutional grant.”). 
 80. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926) (upholding an Ohio village council’s zoning ordinance as a valid exercise 
of authority). 
 81. See id. 
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palities frequently utilize police power to regulate the manner 
in which individuals use property, despite the onerous reper-
cussions this practice sometimes wreaked on landowners.82  
Among the many considerations involved in local land use 
regulations are the desired uses (or undesirable misuses) of air-
space.83 Height restrictions consistent with legitimate govern-
mental interests in “light, air and aesthetics,” among other 
things, are constitutionally permitted and frequently enacted.84 
Pursuant to local interests in suppressing nuisance, a function 
of local police power, municipalities also assume substantial re-
sponsibility for siting airports in a manner that ensures respect 
for individual interests in airspace.85 Technological innovations 
involving the use of airspace—such as crop dusters and up-
scale wind turbines—similarly implicate local interests in 
health, safety, and the general welfare.86 As such, these devel-
opments regularly necessitate legislative action from state and 
municipal authorities, and issues arising from their use are 
evaluated predominantly under standards arising from state or 
local law,87 though not exclusively.88 This local regulatory 
 
 82. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915) (refusing to find 
a taking where state regulation was a valid exercise of its police power, despite 
harsh effects on the plaintiff’s brickmaking business); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 
U.S. 623, 662 (1887) (“[If] a state deems the absolute prohibition of the manu-
facture and sale [of liquor] within her limits . . . to be necessary to the peace 
and security of society, the courts cannot, without usurping legislative func-
tions, override the will of the people . . . .”). 
 83. See WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 385. 
 84. See id.; see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381 (1923).  
 85. See Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962) (holding a 
county liable for a taking in its capacity as “promoter, owner, and lessor of the 
[subject] airport” despite substantial federal oversight and grants made there-
to pursuant to a federal “National Airport Plan”); Thornburg v. Port of Port-
land, 376 P.2d 100 (Or. 1962) (en banc) (same); Kellington & Berger, supra 
note 9, at 7. See generally E. Tazewell Ellett, The National Air Transportation 
System: Design by City Hall?, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 1–3 (1987) (discussing lo-
cal government interests in minimizing liability for airport-related nuisance). 
 86. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-215.117 (West 2013); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 17, § 160.12 (West 2014) (proposed legislation). 
 87. Compare Wilson v. Greg Williams Farm, Inc., 436 S.W.3d 485, 488 
(Ark. 2014) (finding low-altitude application of pesticides not to be an inher-
ently dangerous activity under state law), with Yancey v. Watkins, 708 S.E.2d 
539, 544 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (finding low-altitude application of pesticides an 
inherently dangerous activity under state law). 
 88. See Michael J. Holland, Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: 
Preemption in the Field of Air, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 11, 11 (2011) (“Courts have 
increasingly looked to federal law to determine liability and standard of care 
for such issues as in-flight air operations, pilot training and air space man-
agement, but they have been more reluctant to hold that federal law preempts 
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framework, thus illustrated, reflects the reality that federal in-
terests in the national airspace intersect with states’ and mu-
nicipalities’ interests in protecting persons and property in 
their jurisdictions, promoting beneficial use of natural re-
sources, and compensating victims of negligent or harmful con-
duct in overlying airspace. 
As illustrated, states and municipalities take an active role 
in shaping and defining the rights individuals enjoy in air-
space, and they do so with their police power. Federal legisla-
tion, however, can dilute these efforts, and the resulting ten-
sion resulting therefrom simmers indefinitely, unaddressed and 
unresolved. With commercial UAS use, conflicting interests and 
authority threaten to boil this conflict over. That the current 
regulatory framework serves federal, state, municipal, and in-
dividual interests imperfectly seems evident. Only after untan-
gling the relevant considerations may a solution to this puzzle 
present itself. 
II.  TURBULENCE: RECONCILING HISTORY, DOCTRINE, 
AND EXPERIENCE   
As the history shows, airspace regulation is a forum where 
divergent (and sometimes complementary) interests collide. 
The players are established, but the balance and allocation of 
power among them is shifting. The authority for action at each 
level is stated plainly, but its precise mechanism varies drasti-
cally depending on the circumstances and the stakes. Resulting 
ambiguities and uncertainties cause turbulence for developing 
industries—here, the UAS industry—and those seeking to un-
lock their potential. Section A parses the Pirker decisions in-
troduced at the beginning of this Note, and their implications 
as a tableau of the modern regulatory landscape. Section B 
then evaluates in greater detail the grounds for federal regula-
tion of UAS under the Commerce Clause. Finally, Section C as-
sesses the objects and consequences of current statutes and 
regulatory efforts bearing on UAS operations. 
A. HUERTA V. PIRKER AND THE FMRA: THE MODERN  
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
Recall Raphael Pirker, who was fined $10,000 for flying a 
five-pound Styrofoam plane, equipped with a camera, over the 
 
state law in such areas as product manufacturing defects, failure to warn and 
on-ground aviation accidents.”). 
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University of Virginia.89 When the FAA first brought him be-
fore the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB),90 Pirk-
er’s central argument was that his Styrofoam model airplane 
qualified as a “model aircraft,” and that the FAA had no au-
thority to regulate the use of model aircraft for any purpose.91 
He rested this argument on the FAA’s 1981 Advisory Circular, 
which “encourage[d] voluntary compliance” with enumerated 
safety standards, despite the “hazard” they might pose to “full-
scale aircraft in flight and to persons and property on the sur-
face.”92 This Circular, which preceded the FMRA and was thus 
instructive at the time, did not prohibit commercial use of mod-
el aircraft.93 
The FAA responded with a three-step argument: (1) that 
Pirker’s flight was “for compensation”;94 (2) that, in light of this 
compensation, his alleged “model aircraft” was in fact not a 
model aircraft, but a UAS “aircraft” falling squarely within the 
FAA’s purview;95 and (3) that “as a consequence,”96 his flight 
recklessly endangered the life and property of others in viola-
tion of federal regulations.97 In essence, the FAA sought to as-
sert regulatory control over what would otherwise be a model 
aircraft because it was flown for commercial purposes, an ar-
gument never before made. 
 
 89. See Pirker, Docket No. CP-217, 2014 WL 3388631, at *1–2 (N.T.S.B. 
Mar. 6, 2014). 
 90. Id. As discussed above, the FAA fined Pirker $10,000 for flying a 
Styrofoam plane over the University of Virginia; the subsequent challenge is 
discussed infra.  
 91. See Pirker, 2014 WL 3388631, at *2. 
 92. ADVISORY CIRCULAR, FAA DOC. 91-57 (June 9, 1981) (requesting that 
“[m]odelers . . . [1] [s]elect an operating site that is of sufficient distance from 
populated areas . . . [2] not operate model aircraft in the presence of spectators 
until . . . flight tested and proven airworthy . . . [3] not fly model aircraft high-
er than 400 feet above the surface” and “[4] [g]ive right of way to, and avoid 
flying in the proximity of, full-scale aircraft”). 
 93. See id. 
 94. Pirker, 2014 WL 3388631, at *2.  
 95. Id. See generally Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Air-
space System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689, 6690 (Feb. 13, 2007) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 
91) (requiring “specific authority” to operate UAS in the “National Airspace 
System,” and distinguishing between (1) “UAS operating as public aircraft”; 
(2) “UAS operating as civil aircraft”; and (3) “model aircraft [for which] the au-
thority is AC 91–57”). 
 96. Pirker, 2014 WL 3388631, at *2. 
 97. See Careless or Reckless Operation, 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2015) (“No per-
son may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger 
the life or property of another.” (emphasis added)); see also id. § 1.1 (“Aircraft 
means a device . . . used for flight in the air.”). 
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In a controversial opinion, Judge Geraghty dismissed the 
FAA’s complaint and found that the “[m]odel aircraft operation 
by [Pirker was] subject only to the FAA’s requested voluntary 
compliance with the Safety Guidelines stated in AC 91-57,” and 
that “model aircraft” did not qualify as “aircraft” for the pur-
poses of 14 C.F.R. § 91.13.98 In their excitement, UAS enthusi-
asts failed to take adequate note of Judge Geraghty’s more 
loaded final finding: “[s]pecifically, that at the time of [Pirker’s] 
model aircraft operation . . . there was no enforceable FAA 
rule . . . applicable to model aircraft or for classifying model 
aircraft as an UAS.”99  
On appeal, the NTSB narrowly reversed Judge Geraghty’s 
determination that the FAA could not prosecute reckless opera-
tion of “model aircraft,” but its decision on appeal merely re-
flected rules already codified in the FMRA.100 Indeed, after 
Judge Geraghty rendered his original decision, the FAA re-
quested that the FMRA’s definition of model aircraft supersede 
the AC 91-57’s voluntary guidelines for precisely this reason.101 
The FMRA unambiguously defines “model aircraft” and ex-
empts them from regulation insofar as they do not endanger 
the national airspace system;102 a UAS operated for commercial 
purposes (that is, purposes that are neither hobbyist nor recre-
ational) does not qualify as a “model aircraft.”103 Such devices 
therefore are subject to the FAA’s regulations. Because the 
 
 98. Pirker, 2014 WL 3388631, at *7−8; see also supra notes 91–92, 95.  
 99. Pirker, 2014 WL 3388631, at *5 (emphasis added).  
 100. See id. Curiously, in finding for the FAA, the NTSB recognizes that 
“certain provisions of the [Federal Aviation Regulations] may not be logically 
applicable to model aircraft flown for recreational purposes. But nothing in the 
text of the document disclaims, implicitly or explicitly, the . . . interest in regu-
lating operations of model aircraft that pose a safety hazard.” Id. (emphasis 
added). Why a model aircraft should pose an additional, legally relevant safety 
hazard when converted to a commercial use—thereby losing its status as 
“model aircraft” under the FMRA—goes unaddressed in the opinion.  
 101. See Sachs, supra note 7. The FMRA defines “model aircraft” in rele-
vant part as an aircraft “limited to not more than 55 pounds” and “flown strict-
ly for hobby or recreational use” in accordance with “a community-based set of 
safety guidelines.” FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-95, § 336(a)(1)–(3), 126 Stat. 11, 77 (2012). 
 102. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act § 336. 
 103. Id. Under the FAA’s proposed rules, those operating UAS would have 
to be vetted by the TSA, pass an FAA-approved aeronautical knowledge test 
every two years, obtain a certificate similar to a pilot airman certificate, and 
more. See generally supra note 16 (listing proposed operational limitations, 
aircraft requirements, and operator responsibilities pertaining to UAS and 
those who operate them). 
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FMRA’s definition currently governs, Pirker-esque flights today 
undoubtedly violate federal law.104 Whether this state of the 
law is consistent with the history and purpose of airspace regu-
lation, however, proves the more relevant issue.  
B. CAN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ITS CAKE AND EAT IT  
TOO? 
The FMRA’s prohibition on commercial operation of UAS 
flows from Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Con-
gress did not, however, include a jurisdictional hook in the 
statutory text,105 and thus the mechanism of the prohibition 
remains obscure; the explanation for why the operation of 
commercial UAS in non-navigable airspace qualifies per se as 
“interstate commerce”106 does not immediately present itself. It 
seems uncontroversial to note that some small-scale commer-
cial UAS use does not significantly impact interstate commerce, 
and no court or congress has explicitly established (on a na-
tional scale) that all airspace is a channel of commerce, with all 
activity therein falling within the ambit of Congress’s Com-
merce power. Of course, this does not establish that Congress 
cannot regulate small-scale UAS activity in non-navigable air-
space on these grounds; it merely indicates that such regulato-
ry reach is novel, and therefore requires a justification. As 
such, Congress would likely assert the following justifications 
for the prohibition: (1) that commercial UAS are instrumentali-
ties of commerce; (2) that all commercial UAS use substantially 
affects interstate commerce per se; or (3) that non-navigable 
airspace, like navigable airspace, is a channel of commerce.107 
An argument that commercial UAS are instrumentalities 
of commerce ignores contradictory precedent. In United States 
 
 104. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act § 336(b); Kellington & Berger, 
supra note 9, at 7 (“Given that in FMRA [sic] Congress says that FAA may en-
force its rules against sUAS [small UAS] users, it is logical to assume that 
Congress meant FAA’s rules to be applied to sUAS users as well. . . . There-
fore, the [original] Pirker decision may have little bearing on the operations of 
sUAS in a post FMRA world.”). 
 105. The Supreme Court has found Congress’s decision to exclude a “juris-
dictional element” in a statute—for instance, “in or affecting interstate com-
merce”—as persuasive evidence that the statute falls outside the scope of Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 561 (1995) (“[The statute] contains no jurisdictional element which would 
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question 
affects interstate commerce.” (emphasis added)). 
 106. Id. at 554. 
 107. See id. at 558–59. 
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v. Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down a federal law prohib-
iting the carrying of a firearm in a school zone; that firearms in 
themselves are commodities bought, sold, and carried in inter-
state commerce did not constitute a persuasive defense of the 
statute.108 The FMRA similarly prohibits commercial UAS ac-
tivity, not the “interstate transportation of a commodity,” and 
as such cannot be said to regulate instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce.109 
An alternative argument that all commercial UAS use sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce per se, though somewhat 
more persuasive than the latter argument, likewise proves an 
insufficient defense of the FMRA. Although commercial opera-
tion of UAS plainly seems an economic activity—unlike carry-
ing a firearm,110 possessing marijuana,111 or gender-motivated 
violence112—and some uses are easily classified as serving “tru-
ly national” purposes,113 the technology can certainly be (and 
has certainly been) adapted to serve “truly local” purposes as 
well.114 Without a jurisdictional element,115 which would “en-
sure[] through case-by-case inquiry” that even small-scale 
commercial UAS use substantially affects interstate commerce, 
defending the FMRA’s constitutionality on these grounds would 
prove difficult.116  
The most contentious inquiry is whether non-navigable 
airspace qualifies as a channel of commerce. Since the inception 
of airspace regulation, navigable airspace was established for 
the purpose of facilitating interstate air commerce.117 The CAA 
 
 108. Id. at 559. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 20 (2005). 
 112. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598 (2000) (“[G]ender-
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense, economic activity.”). 
 113. Id. at 599; see, e.g., AMAZON PRIME AIR, http://www.amazon.com/b? 
node=8037720011 (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
 114. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599; see also Drones Hit Roadblock on Path 
To Become Farming Tool, FARMING DRONES (July 27, 2014), http://farming 
drones.com/drones-hit-roadblock-on-path-to-become-farming-tool-business.  
 115. But see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (“Where the class of 
activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the 
courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class.” 
(quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968))). 
 116. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). 
 117. See Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-251, ch. 344, § 9(c), 44 
Stat. 568, 574 (“‘[C]ivil airway’ means a route in the navigable airspace desig-
nated . . . as a route suitable for interstate or foreign air commerce.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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granted a “public right of freedom of transit”118 in the navigable 
airspace and delegated to the Administrator of Civil Aero-
nautics the power to establish civil airways for the purposes of 
interstate air commerce within that airspace.119 Although “nav-
igable airspace” is merely airspace “above the minimum alti-
tudes of flight,” the very distinction between “air commerce” 
and “interstate . . . or foreign air commerce” implies an under-
standing that the navigable airspace would be a channel of in-
terstate commerce.120 Regulation thereof naturally fell within 
the ambit of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  
As Justice Black contended in his Causby dissent, however, 
Congress’s authority over navigable airspace, like its authority 
over navigable waters, is “plenary.”121 Cases preceding Causby 
found ample support for broad congressional authority over 
navigable waters “as broad as the needs of commerce,” and not 
limited merely to “control for navigation.”122 In Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, Justice Rehnquist remarked that “[r]eference 
to . . . navigability . . . adds little if anything to the breadth of 
Congress’ regulatory power over interstate commerce,” and that 
such regulatory power must be understood “in terms of more 
traditional Commerce Clause analysis than by reference to 
[navigability].”123 By analogy, one might suggest that non-
navigable airspace, if a host to “air commerce,”124 should quali-
fy as a channel of commerce.125  
In light of the statutory history of airspace regulation, 
however, this conclusion stretches too far. Only navigable air-
space was thought a venue for interstate commerce, and such 
airspace is unambiguously identifiable, unlike certain bodies of 
water, which may or may not be navigable.126 There exists no 
 
 118. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 3, 52 Stat. 973, 
980 (1938). 
 119. Id. § 301. 
 120. Id. §§ 1(3), (16), (20), (24). 
 121. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 272 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 122. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 
(1940). 
 123. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173–74 (1979). 
 124. See, e.g., Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-251, ch. 344, 44 
Stat. 568, 568 (1926). 
 125. See United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(identifying “airspace” as a channel of commerce). 
 126. See, e.g., PPL Mont., L.L.C. v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1228 (2012) 
(“The Daniel Ball [“navigability in fact”] formulation has been invoked in con-
sidering the navigability of waters for purposes of assessing federal regulatory 
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dispute as to what constitutes navigable and non-navigable air-
space because the distinction is clearly delineated, and the 
quality that makes airspace navigable (altitude) is a definite 
and inalienable characteristic of the spatial corridor to which it 
belongs. For this reason, the scope of federal power over water 
may extend further than it does over airspace by virtue of the 
indefinite qualities that make water navigable, and the result-
ing need for more expansive legislative reach. At the very least, 
the government could therefore argue that the proximity of ac-
tivities within non-navigable airspace to those within navigable 
airspace, and the risk that reckless operation of UAS in non-
navigable airspace could pose a danger to interstate commerce 
in navigable airspace, might permit coordinate regulation of all 
airspace. In other words, although non-navigable airspace is 
not a channel of commerce, collateral regulation of non-
navigable airspace, undergone to protect the integrity of navi-
gable airspace, is permitted under Congress’s commerce power.  
If this is the case, then the regulatory framework currently 
in place is riddled with inconsistencies. On the one hand, the 
FAA’s AC 91-57, as interpreted by the FAA, prohibits operation 
of UAS absent a certificate of authorization,127 and obtaining a 
certificate of authorization has proven immensely complex and 
difficult.128 That the NTSB vacillated in recognizing any bind-
ing authority to reinforce the FAA’s safety argument, without 
even considering the incipient commerce issues on the table, 
complicates this development.129 On the other hand, the FMRA 
reserves for the FAA Administrator the power “to pursue en-
forcement action against persons operating model aircraft who 
endanger the safety of the national airspace system,” but it de-
nies the administrator the power to promulgate any other rules 
regarding model aircraft flown for hobby or recreational pur-
poses.130 Why should a model aircraft, at first subject only to a 
generalized safety requirement, suddenly become subject to an 
 
authority under the Constitution, and the application of specific federal stat-
utes, as to the waters and their beds.”). 
 127. Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 
Fed. Reg. 6689, 6690 (Feb. 13, 2007) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91). Under the 
proposed rules, this requirement would not be as stringent, although a similar 
requirement would apply. See supra note 103. 
 128. See, e.g., Astraeus Aerial, Docket No. FAA-2014-0352 (FAA Sept. 25, 
2014). 
 129. See supra Part II.A. 
 130. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 
§ 336(b), 126 Stat. 11, 77 (2012).  
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expansive system of regulation when its owner converts it to a 
commercial use? The implicit distinction here between hobbyist 
and commercial uses seems arbitrary in light of the identical 
safety risks posed by both commercial UAS and model aircraft. 
To wit, there is no clear reason why commercial UAS in non-
navigable airspace pose more danger to airspace as a channel of 
commerce than hobbyist model aircraft. 
The FMRA’s “model aircraft” exemption demonstrates, by 
its own terms, that low altitude, small-scale commercial UAS 
use poses little, if any, additional danger to persons or property 
on the ground than do “model aircraft.” The FAA’s safety con-
cerns, though not resolved by the FMRA, are addressed in the 
FMRA’s definition of “model aircraft,” which demands opera-
tion of a small UAS (that is, less than 55 pounds) “in accord-
ance with a community-based set of safety guidelines”131 in “a 
manner that does not interfere with and gives way to any 
manned aircraft,”132 and which involves communication with 
airport operators when in close proximity to airports.133 When 
operated in accordance with these standards, the UAS is al-
ready immune to regulation; if an operator ignores these 
standards, then she stands vulnerable to prosecution by the 
FAA.134 That commercial UAS operators would need to comply 
with these safety requirements as well detracts significantly 
from arguments that suggest such use is inherently more dan-
gerous than “model aircraft” use as currently defined. Without 
a more compelling distinction between the risks and capacities 
of commercial UAS versus model aircraft, the government’s au-
thority to comprehensively regulate either diminishes. 
C. COMPETING VALUES: OVERLYING IMPERFECTION VERSUS  
UNDERLYING PERFECTION 
As it stands, non-navigable airspace likely does not in itself 
qualify as a channel of commerce. But this would not stand in 
the way of regulations promulgated for the purpose of protect-
ing the navigable airspace, which is a channel of commerce. 
Whether this reasoning vindicates the FMRA’s prohibition on 
commercial UAS may therefore depend on the significance giv-
en the spatial distinction between navigable and non-navigable 
 
 131. Id. § 336(a)(2). 
 132. Id. § 336(a)(4). 
 133. Id. § 336(a)(5). 
 134. Rafael Pirker’s case seems an apt example in this respect. See id.; see 
also supra Part II.A. 
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airspace. Under the Braniff view,135 the individual’s right to 
use airspace exists “subject to the dominant servitude in the 
United States to regulate commerce in the air.”136 This view 
permits a great degree of federal intrusion into otherwise pri-
vate airspace, so long as the intrusion may be tied to commer-
cial intercourse. The Aaron view, however, which presumes a 
taking when the federal government so intrudes, stands for the 
proposition that such intrusions require compensation, even if 
grounded on constitutional powers.137 The prime difference be-
tween these views rests on their regard for individuals’ sub-
stantive rights in airspace. 
Although one might contend that the Braniff is most con-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine, 
one might contend with equal force that the Aaron view is most 
consistent with the structure of federalism among the govern-
mental entities that comprise the United States. Because Aa-
ron sets a concrete hurdle in the path of the federal regulations 
of non-navigable airspace, it deters sweeping federal regulation 
and allows states more leeway to shape and define individual 
rights to utilize non-navigable airspace. Braniff, by contrast, 
may encourage sweeping federal regulation affecting non-
navigable airspace, which, although likely permissible under 
the Commerce Clause, may phase out states’ influence on the 
rights enjoyed therein. 
Because FAA regulations and the FMRA substantially cir-
cumscribe all commercial UAS use, regardless of whether it af-
fects interstate commerce, it seems commonsense to suggest 
that they both shape and define individual property rights in 
non-navigable airspace. The implication of these substantive 
rights is more immediately acceptable under the Braniff vision 
of airspace than under Aaron’s vision. Nevertheless, Aaron’s vi-
sion may be more consistent with the Supreme Court’s sub-
stantive rights doctrine. In United States v. Windsor, the Su-
preme Court indicated that the Federal Government’s 
prerogative to regulate diminishes when such regulations nega-
tively implicate rights traditionally within the purview of state 
regulation.138 Although Windsor spoke to marriage rights—long 
 
 135. See generally supra Part I.C. 
 136. Bydlon v. United States, 146 Ct. Cl. 764, 770 (1959) (expounding upon 
Braniff’s outline of federal power); see also supra Part I.D. 
 137. See supra Part I.D. 
 138. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013) (“[T]he 
Federal Government, through our history, has deferred to state-law policy de-
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recognized as fundamental,139 unlike economic property rights 
in airspace140—history demonstrates that states have long 
shaped and defined individual rights in airspace.141  
Although one might note that federal laws and applicable 
doctrine by definition shape and define individual rights in air-
space, the same laws and doctrines also defer substantially to 
individual rights in airspace, as well as state prerogatives to 
shape and define these rights. The Court in Causby abrogated 
the ad coelum doctrine and substantially reduced individual 
claims to overlying airspace, but it also reaffirmed individual 
property rights in airspace within the “immediate reaches of 
the enveloping atmosphere,” and it confirmed that airspace was 
capable of appropriation, as understood and recognized since 
Roman times as a common law precept.142 Further, the ACA 
permitted states to “set apart and provide for the protection of 
necessary airspace reservations in addition to and not in con-
flict either with airspace reservations established by the Presi-
dent . . . or with any civil or military airway” established pur-
suant to the Act, which suggests congressional deference to a 
greater degree of state influence below the navigable air-
space.143 Such deference is not novel when privately owned 
property interests are at stake.144 That variable state stand-
ards (with regards to trespass, nuisance, and other doctrines 
that similarly implicate individuals’ substantive rights in air-
 
cisions with respect to domestic relations.”). 
 139. See generally, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating 
all anti-miscegenation laws). 
 140. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 
104 (1978) (noting Penn Central’s rights to the airspace above its property yet 
not finding city’s restrictions on uses of this airspace to be a compensable tak-
ing). 
 141. See supra Parts I.A, D. 
 142. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946). 
 143. See Air Commerce Act of 1926, 41 Pub. L. 568, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568, 
570 (1926). 
 144. Consider, for instance, the fact that most zoning codes have prohibited 
(in varying degrees) commercial activity in residential areas for nearly a cen-
tury. E.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and 
the Home-Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1194–95 (2001) 
(“[I]ndividuals who want to work at home face significant legal obstacles, es-
pecially municipal zoning laws that severely restrict the operation of home 
businesses when they do not prohibit them outright.”); see also Village of Eu-
clid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392 (1926) (“The segregation of indus-
tries, commercial pursuits, and dwellings to particular districts in a city, when 
exercised reasonably, may bear a rational relation to the health, morals, safe-
ty, and general welfare of the community.”). 
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space) remain virtually untouched by federal airspace regula-
tions suggests, as in Windsor, that states’ prerogatives in the 
realm of non-navigable airspace remain substantial.145  
This analysis does not question the FMRA’s constitutional-
ity. On the contrary, the Commerce Clause almost certainly 
gives Congress the power to regulate non-navigable airspace in 
a manner that secures the safety of the navigable airspace.146 
But in mandating federal approval of all commercial UAS in 
non-navigable airspace, the federal government usurps state 
prerogatives in the sky, and limits states’ capacity to shape and 
define the manner in which the commercial UAS industry de-
velops in their respective jurisdictions. The very prospect that 
federal laws of this sort would subordinate state influence in 
airspace compelled the ACA’s distinction between navigable 
and non-navigable airspace in the first place.147 
In addition, the FMRA’s ban on commercial UAS carries 
potentially dire ramifications under existing Takings doctrine. 
Under Braniff and Aaron, the existence of congressional au-
thority to regulate remains nearly as certain as the determina-
tion of federal liability for intrusions in non-navigable airspace. 
If, for instance, the federal government passes a regulation 
permitting intrusion into non-navigable airspace using the 
Commerce Clause, the regulation is legitimate under Braniff, 
but likely a taking under Aaron.148 In the context of commercial 
UAS regulation in non-navigable airspace, this analysis could 
 
 145. See, e.g., supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text; see also Abdullah 
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 375 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Even though we have 
found federal preemption of the standards of aviation safety, we still conclude 
that the traditional state and territorial law remedies continue to exist for vio-
lation of those standards. Federal preemption of the standards of care can co-
exist with state and territorial tort remedies.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 
256 (1964) (recognizing congressional power under the Commerce Clause “to 
keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious us-
es”); cf. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 
(1940) (“[A]uthority [to regulate navigable waters] is as broad as the needs of 
commerce. Water power development from dams in navigable streams is from 
the public’s standpoint a by-product of the general use of the rivers for com-
merce.”). 
 147. See supra note 48. 
 148. Whether the regulation would require compensation remains uncer-
tain. The Aaron court faced a physical, rather than regulatory, intrusion. See 
supra notes 74–76. Its language suggests, however, that regulatory intrusion 
may be equally problematic. See Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798, 801 
(1963) (suggesting that courts consider “whether the relevant statutes and 
regulations [permitting damage to private property interests] violated the 
property owner’s constitutional rights” (emphasis added)). 
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support a finding that the FMRA works an unprecedentedly 
massive taking, because even commercial UAS activity that 
does not affect interstate commerce and which does not occur in 
a channel of commerce is essentially prohibited, at least until 
the FAA’s regulations are implemented permanently.149 Indi-
viduals who acquired property with the understanding that 
they could use inexpensive technology such as UAS to assist 
their small-scale enterprises, and who cannot otherwise utilize 
their airspace in a manner that is commercially feasible, may 
have a colorable constitutional claim against the federal gov-
ernment. This will ring especially true when the value of the 
airspace is distinguishable from the parcel’s value, as is some-
times the case with wind estates.150 In one sense, such a taking 
is tantamount to pre-ACA suggestions that the federal govern-
ment simply use its power of eminent domain to acquire all air-
space.151 
Though the latter statements may raise some eyebrows, 
the possible constitutional claims to which this Note refers re-
main fully distinguishable from ostensibly adverse Supreme 
Court precedent. For instance, one likely counterargument, 
 
 149. This formulation remains simplistic in several respects, but not alto-
gether unlikely. One could object that a taking in this context is unlikely be-
cause, like development moratoria, the ban is temporary. Cf. Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 323 
(2002) (refusing to find that temporary regulatory moratoria effect a per se 
taking on affected landowners). Further, the Supreme Court has previously 
refused to enjoin government action “forbid[ding] the private use of certain 
airspace.” Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978)). Unless the regulation reduces an entire parcel’s property value mark-
edly, one might say, such regulation would not require compensation as a tak-
ing. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131. 
These objections, while formidable, are surmountable. Indeed, the tempo-
rary prohibition on commercial UAS use is but a placeholder for onerous fu-
ture burdens on all such use currently in the making, and imposed by the fed-
eral government. See supra note 16. Moreover, sweeping impediments to 
commercial use of all private airspace are far more difficult to justify than lim-
itations on the use of “certain” private airspace, as was the case in Penn Cen-
tral. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302. Because all government actions, in this 
respect, must at least be rational, see Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131, this differ-
ence in scope remains highly relevant to any Takings inquiry. As Troy Rule 
points out, scholars and courts have recently proved more amenable than not 
to the argument that airspace is a natural resource, and that damage to inter-
ests therein may constitute a complete loss. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace and the 
Takings Clause, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 421, 465 & nn.205–10 (2012). If, there-
fore, the federal government’s regulatory authority is found constitutional, its 
exercise thereof may require more money than it is prepared to deliver. 
 150. See Rule, supra note 149. 
 151. See BANNER, supra note 25, at 99–100. 
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enunciated in Andrus v. Allard, is that depriving property of its 
most profitable use does not and should not necessarily consti-
tute a governmental taking.152 In Allard, however, Congres-
sional authority to regulate the property at issue (eagle feath-
ers) in the manner at issue (taking, selling, and purchasing) 
was plainly reasonable. A conspicuous absence of dissenters in 
the case, coupled with the commonsense observation that per-
mitting the sale of pre-Eagle Protection Act feathers⎯often in-
distinguishable from post-Eagle Protection Act feathers⎯would 
facilitate circumvention of the law, validate this statement.153 
Airspace, by contrast, is murkier property insofar as its value is 
more difficult to quantify, and the sense in subjecting it to com-
prehensive regulation seems dubious at best.154 The scope of 
the FAA’s regulations, both present and future, remains diffi-
cult to justify under the Court’s recent Commerce Clause deci-
sions. Even when juxtaposed with the Court’s Penn Central 
case, which refused to find a regulatory taking of airspace, the 
Court only considered the legitimacy of local law in a narrowly 
confined airspace arena.155 In short, this author was unable to 
discern any Supreme Court precedent precluding a successful 
Takings claim against the government in this context.156 
Taken alongside concerns regarding the FMRA’s impact on 
states’ prerogative to regulate airspace, the current state of the 
law contravenes prominent federalist policies and concerns 
spanning the entire development of airspace regulation, and 
may impose nearly insurmountable administrative burdens on 
the federal government with regards to Takings liability.157 
Everybody loses. In truth, though, this problem is the child of 
uncertainty as to the balance of power between states and the 
federal government, as well as the reach of federal authority in 
 
 152. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). 
 153. See id. at 58. 
 154. See supra Part II.B (“[T]here is no clear reason why commercial UAS 
in non-navigable airspace pose more danger to airspace as a channel of com-
merce than hobbyist model aircraft.”). 
 155. See supra note 149. Indeed, this Note, like the Supreme Court, does 
not take issue with local laws of the sort at issue in Penn Central; it is federal 
action that remains concerning.  
 156. Other adverse precedent addressing inverse condemnation, like Allard 
and Penn Central, is readily distinguishable. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 
239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding a local ordinance precluding brickmaking be-
cause it regulated an easily identifiable nuisance). 
 157. See generally supra Part I.B (discussing early congressional efforts to 
harness airspace, and noting that Congress elected not to use its war powers 
in asserting regulatory authority therein). 
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airspace under the Commerce Clause. Dispelling the uncertain-
ty will diminish its attendant fallout.  
III.  DRAIN THE SKY: THE NEED TO DISCARD 
UNNECESSARY REGULATIONS   
The federal government has flooded the sky with regula-
tions, including the FMRA’s effective ban on commercial UAS 
use. The ban is not technically absolute, for an opportunistic 
individual or organization could seek a certificate of authoriza-
tion to use UAS below the navigable airspace; the issue is that 
the FAA only rarely considers issuing such certificates, and 
when it does, it subjects the certificate holder to exceedingly 
rigorous standards.158 Amending the FMRA to include a juris-
dictional element would serve to shield not only the FMRA, but 
the FAA’s future regulatory efforts—and its recently released 
proposed rules159—from legal challenge, while providing con-
crete guidance to both individuals and regulatory actors on 
what is and is not permitted.160  
The jurisdictional element, the benefits one might expect to 
flow therefrom, and the hurdles to be overcome in the process 
are addressed in Section A. Section B then recognizes the prac-
tical limitations of amending the FMRA, but responds that 
greater clarity in the law substantially eliminates open ques-
tions as to authority to govern airspace, as well as the extent of 
an individual’s stake in her overlying airspace, both of which 
plague the modern regulatory framework. Simply put, includ-
ing a jurisdictional element in the FMRA would foster growth 
in the UAS industry by draining the sky of superfluous regula-
tion. 
A. TEMET NOSCE: A JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT WILL CLARIFY  
ROLES AND RIGHTS 
The FMRA’s definition of “model aircraft,” a class of air-
craft immune from FAA regulation, permits only “hobby or rec-
 
 158. See, e.g., Astraeus Aerial, Docket No. FAA-2014-0352 (FAA Sept. 25, 
2014); see also Kellington & Berger, supra note 9. 
 159. See supra note 103. 
 160. Of course, this guidance will not cure all. Some commentators have 
deemed the regulatory process confusing and circular, leading to many dead 
ends. See Nicholas R. Bednar, Note, Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary 
Requirements of “Particularity” and “Social Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Ad-
judications, 100 MINN. L. REV. 355, 396 (2015); Samuel D. Posnick, Note, A 
Merry-Go-Round of Metal and Manipulation: Toward a New Framework for 
Commodity Exchange Self-Regulation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 441, 454−60 (2015). 
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reational use,” implicitly excluding commercial use.161 Seen 
alongside the FAA’s interpretation of AC 91-57, it seems likely 
that the law, as it currently stands, is a sweeping bar to com-
mercial UAS use by the great majority of landowners with a 
stake in productive use of their overlying airspace. Following 
Huerta v. Pirker, however, which indicated that AC 91-57 does 
not qualify as binding law,162 still proves treacherous for indi-
viduals and businesses. The FAA, after all, continues to issue 
cease-and-desist letters threatening litigation.163 For this rea-
son, there seems a bald need for more clarity in the law as to 
permissible and impermissible activity, for the sake of individ-
ual, corporate, and government entities alike. Subsection 1 
proposes a concrete way to achieve this clarity and outlines the 
manifold benefits to be expected therefrom, while Subsection 2 
acknowledges some practical, but manageable, difficulties that 
may complicate progressive efforts. 
1. Amending the FMRA 
Amending a jurisdictional element into the FMRA’s defini-
tion of “model aircraft”—that is, changing “the aircraft is flown 
strictly for hobby or recreational use”164 to “the aircraft is flown 
for hobby, recreational, or other use not in or affecting com-
merce”—would considerably help alleviate this confusion. Such 
an amendment would confine the scope of the Act, and subse-
quent regulations, to either activities in the navigable airspace 
or to activities in non-navigable airspace which in fact affect in-
terstate commerce. The resulting benefits would be three-fold: 
(1) promoting clarity in the law and narrowing the regulatory 
role of the FAA; (2) defining and reinforcing individuals’ legiti-
mate interests in airspace; and (3) carving out an area of influ-
ence for state and municipal entities with an interest in guid-
ing the use and development of UAS in their respective 
jurisdictions. 
As written, the FMRA perpetuates a flawed theory of fed-
eral regulatory power. Non-navigable airspace is not a channel 
of commerce, despite its proximity to navigable airspace. Su-
preme Court doctrine thus requires that the object of regulation 
 
 161. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 
§ 336(a)(1), 126 Stat. 11, 77 (2012). 
 162. See supra Part II.A. 
 163. See supra note 10. 
 164. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 
§ 336(a)(1). 
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either qualifies as an instrument of commerce or an activity 
that substantially affects interstate commerce.165 Because the 
FMRA does not regulate an instrumentality of commerce, the 
only theory that justifies its effective ban considers all commer-
cial UAS operation below non-navigable airspace to affect in-
terstate commerce, a dubious prospect at best. So long as the 
FAA asserts regulatory authority over all commercial activities 
in airspace, the regulatory framework’s conformity with Su-
preme Court doctrine will remain vulnerable to challenge, and 
Pirker leaves reason to believe that the federal government 
may well lose its interpretive battle in the courts.  
The Court in Lopez struck down the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act due, in part, to the fact that it lacked a jurisdictional 
element. It said that without a jurisdictional element “which 
might limit [the Act’s] reach to a discrete set of firearm posses-
sions that additionally have an explicit connection with or ef-
fect on interstate commerce,” the statute prohibited activity 
without a tie to interstate commerce, and thus exceeded Con-
gress’s power under the Commerce Clause.166 Although com-
mercial drone activity, unlike firearm possession, plainly seems 
commercial, many commercial UAS uses would not have a 
“substantial effect . . . visible to the naked eye” on interstate 
commerce.167 Tweaking the FMRA’s definition of “model air-
craft” to include commercial activity not in or affecting inter-
state commerce would sidestep this issue and handily confine 
congressional authority, and FAA regulatory authority, to con-
stitutionally enumerated criteria. Not only would this insulate 
the FMRA from constitutional attack, but it would also narrow 
the FAA’s regulatory role in a manner that simplifies enforce-
ment of existing law, thereby conserving valuable government 
resources rather than wasting them on frivolous cease-and-
desist letters and elaborate administrative battles. 
States, municipalities, and individuals would reap a mas-
sive benefit from such an amendment as well. Those who are 
eager to utilize commercial UAS on a small scale would be able 
to take definitive steps towards incorporating UAS into their 
business practices. This is particularly significant to the emerg-
ing precision farming practice, for which UAS are an inexpen-
sive substitute to costly alternatives.168 States which suffer 
 
 165. See supra Part II.B. 
 166. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (emphasis added). 
 167. Id. at 563. 
 168. See Drones for Agricultural Crop Surveillance, PRECISION DRONE, 
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from water shortages or scarcity of resources, like California, 
could meaningfully benefit from a farming community able to 
utilize UAS to monitor their fields and allocate water and re-
sources more efficiently and effectively. In other fields, too, the 
capacity to use commercial UAS would not only awaken a 
promising market, but also provide an opportunity for the in-
choate industry to grow and develop alongside evident and ur-
gent communal needs. That these benefits would coincide with 
more robust protections for individuals’ property interests in 
airspace generally, thereby buttressing individuals’ tangential 
interests in privacy and property, is an added bonus. States 
and municipalities, in turn, would benefit from “having a say” 
in how individuals and organizations could use UAS, and in en-
couraging certain uses having peculiar benefit to the state.  
Put simply, airspace extends from the space between 
blades of grass up to the stratosphere.169 The federal govern-
ment lays claim to all of it, and until now, their position was 
largely accepted, as the uses one could put to airspace re-
mained limited.170 The emerging UAS industry’s ever-
expanding list of productive capacities171 makes this compara-
tively narrow area of non-navigable airspace far more valuable 
than ever before. As such, the federal government’s position is 
untenable and unwise in the evolving arena of airspace, and 
entities at all levels have much to gain and nothing to lose in 
changing course. Any change, however, must predate the FAA’s 
regulations in order to maximize its potential benefits.  
2. Getting There and Back Again 
Including a jurisdictional element in the FMRA is not a 
minor change. It would represent a sea change in the scheme 
and theory of federal power over airspace thus far. The FAA 
does not simply choose not to regulate model aircraft, but is 
prohibited from regulating them in the text of the FMRA.172 If 
 
http://www.precisiondrone.com/agriculture (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (“Using 
drones for crop surveillance can drastically increase farm crop yields while 
minimizing the cost of walking the fields or airplane fly-over filming.”). 
 169. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “airspace” as 
“[t]he space that extends upward from the surface of land”). 
 170. See generally Parts I.B, II.A. 
 171. See, e.g., Joseph Dussault, 7 Commercial Uses for Drones, BOS. GLOBE 
(Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.boston.com/business/2014/03/14/commercial-uses 
-for-drones/dscS47PsQdPneIB2UQeY0M/story.html. 
 172. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336, 
126 Stat. 11, 77 (2012). 
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the FMRA is amended to include a jurisdictional element, then 
Congress essentially says that the federal government—and by 
extension, the FAA—does not have exclusive sovereignty over 
airspace. As discussed, this is likely already true, but the prop-
osition nevertheless contravenes a nearly century-old federal 
policy and a strictly top-down regulatory framework. This is 
not, therefore, an issue the FAA takes lightly. 
Add to this Americans’ skepticism of UAS,173 and surpas-
sing the already-inevitable congressional gridlock may seem 
improbable. A recent poll suggests a 2:1 ratio of Americans op-
posed to commercial operation of UAS against those in favor, 
although there was more support for uses like “inspecting oil 
platforms and bridges,” mapping “terrain through aerial pho-
tography,” and “monitor[ing] wildlife.”174 This skepticism will 
certainly temper any attempt to corral the requisite political 
capital to amend the FMRA. 
In lieu of an amendment to the FMRA, states should con-
tinue to promulgate regulations relating to UAS. Already, 
many states have passed laws relating to intrastate UAS use in 
anticipation of the economic benefits expected to flow there-
from.175 Although uncertainty in the law has compelled some 
states to hedge and qualify enacted measures,176 the Pirker de-
cisions—alongside the history belying the current regulatory 
framework—cast doubt upon the federal government’s asserted 
supremacy in the field. If states begin to promote their inter-
ests in non-navigable airspace, they will gain headway in shap-
ing and defining the manner by which individuals utilize air-
space, particularly UAS, in their jurisdictions.  
B. HAVING THE CAKE AND EATING SOME  
Amending the FMRA will not eliminate the ambiguities 
inherent in the modern regulatory framework that governs air-
space. Even if the federal government’s regulatory power in 
this area is construed as limited to navigable airspace or activi-
 
 173. See Turza, supra note 12, at 321 (“Many Americans are skeptical, if 
not outright scared, of having drones flying over suburbia invading their back-
yard barbeque privacy.”). 
 174. Joan Lowy & Jennifer Agiesta, Poll: Americans Skeptical of Commer-
cial Drones, PHYS.ORG (Dec. 19, 2014), http://phys.org/news/2014-12-poll 
-americans-skeptical-commercial-drones.html. 
 175. See, e.g., S. 1892, 2014 Gen. Assemb., 108th Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014). 
 176. See, e.g., H.R. 1029, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2014) (“The provisions 
of this Section shall apply unless preempted by applicable federal law or by 
regulations adopted by the [FAA].”). 
  
438 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:405 
 
ties in non-navigable airspace that affect interstate commerce, 
a great many small-scale activities may indeed fall within the 
ambit of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.177 
Further, the FAA and Congress may persist in their theory 
that the federal government reigns supreme above state and 
municipal governments in the realm of navigable and non-
navigable airspace, despite conceding that “model aircraft” in-
clude those aircraft used for commercial purposes which do not 
affect interstate commerce. The FAA, for instance, may contin-
ue sending cease-and-desist letters to individuals and compa-
nies that utilize UAS, and may continue pursuing litigation 
against individuals like Raphael Pirker. Regulatory efforts, 
likewise, may continue to flow from the federal government, 
with states reticently asserting authority in its wake, and sub-
ject to federal preemption. The battle for control over airspace 
will persist until resolved definitively. 
Nor will an amendment address the FAA’s safety concerns 
about UAS in the national airspace. The proximity of non-
navigable airspace requires UAS operators to ensure their UAS 
can adequately maintain a safe altitude, steer clear of airports, 
and remain within their line of sight. Indeed, on the rare occa-
sion that the FAA issues a certificate of authorization to pri-
vate parties for commercial UAS operations, it indicates the 
importance of preserving the integrity of the navigable air-
space, and of protecting persons and property on the ground.178 
Furthermore, the FMRA cements the FAA’s right to pursue ac-
tion against anyone who recklessly operates a UAS.179 The 
FAA’s prime duty, historically, has been to ensure safety in the 
air and on the ground with regard to air commerce. There 
 
 177. This might depend on the size and influence of the entity using the 
technology. A large-scale farming operation that undertakes to use commercial 
UAS to facilitate its enterprise may well have a greater impact on interstate 
commerce than a local farmer who oversees one or two parcels. A national 
news agency that uses drones to gather photographs may be subject to federal 
regulation, as compared to a local news company whose influence and reader-
ship remains narrowly confined to a single (or several) localities. A powerful 
film company that employs drones to capture footage for use in a major motion 
picture would likely fall within the scope of federal regulatory power, whereas 
an independent filmmaker may not. Of course, the distinction between what is 
truly national and what is truly local remains a thorny issue, see generally 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and any speculation on the impact of 
these activities should be tempered by the prospect of further clarification 
from Congress and the courts. 
 178. See Astraeus Aerial, Docket No. FAA-2014-0352 (FAA Sept. 25, 2014). 
 179. See supra note 5.  
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seems little doubt, therefore, that safety considerations weigh 
heavily on Congress’s decision to effectively bar commercial 
UAS before the FAA issues a comprehensive system of regula-
tions. Amending the FMRA, and thereby permitting small-scale 
use of UAS in non-navigable airspace across the country, leaves 
issues posed by large-scale use of UAS unaddressed.  
Despite these limitations, an amendment to the FMRA 
would serve to clarify somewhat persistent ambiguities in the 
modern regulatory framework that needlessly complicate en-
forcement efforts. Although ambiguity will remain as to what 
level of government controls what altitudes under what cir-
cumstances, the proposed amendment would send a clear mes-
sage that non-navigable airspace falls primarily within states’ 
prerogative and preserves individual interests in airspace. This 
message does not substantially abrogate federal authority over 
non-navigable airspace so much as it shifts the balance of regu-
latory power over non-navigable airspace toward the states. Its 
message is implicit, not explicit, and the prospective benefits it 
offers to individuals, states, and even the FAA far outweigh the 
abstract loss of federal regulatory control over a narrow spatial 
corridor. 
Additionally, the FAA cannot offer a satisfactory safety-
based justification for expansive regulatory power over non-
navigable airspace. As discussed, commercial UAS and model 
aircraft operating below navigable airspace pose identical risks 
to persons and property on the ground.180 Why one should go 
unregulated while the other idles in a legal purgatory seems 
inexplicable, and at times utterly counterintuitive. Indeed, the 
FMRA fails to specify what altitudes “model aircraft” operators 
should or should not maintain, indicating that one may fly a 
model aircraft (strictly for hobby or recreational use) in the 
navigable airspace without violating any relevant law or regu-
lation. If the FAA considers model aircraft in the navigable air-
space safe, then small-scale commercial operation of UAS below 
the navigable airspace cannot possibly pose any special danger 
to the navigable airspace, let alone persons or property on the 
ground. The proposed amendment would therefore not jeopard-
ize the security of the national airspace system. 
 
 
 180. See supra Part II.B. 
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  CONCLUSION   
Entities at all levels—that is, the federal government, 
states, municipalities, and individuals—share interests in pre-
serving the integrity of the national airspace system. The fed-
eral government, however, has asserted sovereignty over all 
airspace, thereby reducing the primacy of other entities’ inter-
ests in using and controlling activities within overlying air-
space. This state of the law is inconsistent with the history and 
development of airspace regulation, which reflects an unabat-
ing recognition of individual interests in overlying airspace, as 
well as pervasive state prerogative to shape and define individ-
uals’ rights to use and enjoy that space. In this respect, there 
seems an incompatibility between the current regulatory hier-
archy and the rights traditionally afforded individuals to su-
peradjacent airspace. 
The advent of commercial UAS technology brings this con-
flict to the fore. Commercial UAS carry the potential to trans-
form the way individual and governmental entities use and 
govern airspace. But federal policy, as it stands now, has ham-
pered individuals’ capacity to make productive use of UAS, and 
stifled the developing UAS industry. Amending the FMRA’s 
definition of “model aircraft” to permit commercial uses not in 
or affecting commerce would address this issue by clarifying 
federal and state roles in regulating airspace, and by protecting 
individual interests in airspace. The additional clarity such an 
amendment would imbue in the modern regulatory landscape 
with regard to federal and state authority would provide long-
lasting benefits to the structure and content of both federal and 
state regulations in the future. As a result, the states and indi-
viduals with a significant interest in commercial operations of 
UAS would find themselves able to pursue these interests 
without federal interference, and in a manner that allows the 
young industry to grow and develop to meet local needs around 
the country.  
 
 
